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Abstract
The authors  use data from Ethiopia to empirically  assess  poverty.  Households who  have part-time jobs in  the off-
determinants of participation  in land  rental markets,  farm sector are significantly more likely  to expect land to
compare these  to those of administrative  land  be taken away  from them through administrative  means.
reallocation,  and make inferences  on  the likely  impact of  Eliminating  the scope  for administrative land  reallocation
households' expectations  regarding future  redistribution.  may  thus be a  precondition for more vigorous
Results  indicate that rental markets outperform  development of the off-farm sector.
administrative  reallocation  in terms of efficiency  and
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1. Introduction
In poor agrarian economies, land  is not only a key factor of production but also performs an essential role
as an insurance device and  a social safety net. Ownership of land  can provide  access to credit  which will
enable households to make indivisible  investments they would otherwise have not been able to undertake
(Galor and  Zeira  1993,  Banerjee and Newman  1993).  Where markets  for output or  labor are  imperfect,
access to land,  even if only through  use rights,  can help households make effective  use of family labor,
and improve their nutritional  status (Burgess 2001).  The social importance of land, together with the fact
that  patterns  of  land  allocation  will  affect  efficiency  of  agricultural  production,  have  motivated
governments  in  countries  where,  often  for  historical  reasons,  access  to  land  was  highly  unequal,  to
intervene  in  the  functioning  of markets  through  land  reforms  that aimed  to  equalize  the  ownership
distribution  of land. While the impact did not always  live up to original expectations,  reforms that gave
more secure rights to households  have generally  had a markedly positive impact on welfare,  productivity,
and social peace (King 1977, Lin 1992, Binswanger et al. 1995).
One  issue  that has  been subject to debate  is  whether,  once an  egalitarian  ownership distribution  has
been  attained,  further  intervention  to  maintain  such  equality  will  either  be  needed  or  even  beneficial
(Banerjee  2000).  In  fact,  a  number of arguments  suggest that such  intervention  may  be detrimental to
growth and equity goals. Uncertainty about whether or not plots will be possessed  in the future is likely to
reduce investment incentives. Administrators  may be unable to observe producers'  agricultural ability and
thus  give land to households who are unable to make the best use of it. Moreover, the need to demonstrate
a "need" for land or its "productive"  use may in the longer term induce higher population growth and in a
more  immediate  context,  undermine  incentives  for  migration  and  non-agricultural  investment  by
households  if they  have  to fear  that,  such  activities  will  increase  their  risk of losing  their  land  (Yang
1997).This  issue  is  of critical  importance  for  Ethiopia  where,  a  decade  after  the  government  has  started  to
individualize  land  rights,  allow  land  rental,  and  largely  eliminate  the  scope  for  land  redistribution,
political  pressure  for renewed redistribution  is  building  up in  a number of regions  (Ethiopian  Economic
Association 2002). To  decide whether to continue  pursuing  an interventionist  stance towards land  rights
and  land  markets  or to move towards  abandonment  of administrative  controls  in favor of decentralized
land  allocation,  it  will  be  important  to  know  how  well  markets  function,  how  they  compare  to
administrative  reallocation  of land,  and  whether  the  threat of being  subject  to  such  intervention  leads
households to adjust their behavior. Few studies have tried to empirically explore this issue and this paper
aims to contribute at filling this gap.
First, we are  interested whether  and to what extent  land markets  contribute  to the dual  goals of greater
equity and efficiency  in the rural economy. To assess whether concerns about a negative equity impact of
land rental market functioning are justified, we explore whether such markets transfer land to households
with  lower  land  endowments  and  whether  there  is  evidence  of an  "agricultural  ladder"  whereby  it  is
possible for households  to make the transition  from sharecropping to fixed rent tenancy.  To ascertain the
impact  on  economic  efficiency,  we  probe  whether  markets  provide  access  to  land  for  producers  with
higher levels of ability.  We find that markets  and administrative mechanisms tend to transfer land to more
productive  and  poorer households.  This  would  suggest that  there is  little reason  to be concerned  about
potential  negative  effects of the emergence  of rental markets  as, with more and more off-farm  migration
and non-farm  employment,  the need for reallocation of land increases.
A  second  issue  to  be  explored,  based  on  the  identification  of factors  contributing  to  land  access  via
markets  in contrast to other mechanisms,  is to compare the historical  performance  of land markets to that
of administrative  land  reallocation.  In  addition  to  descriptive  evidence  highlighting that  rental markets
have  recently  become  quantitatively  more  important  than  administrative  land reallocation,  we  find that
reallocation  appears to have  been  undertaken  largely on political  grounds, contributing  neither to higher
levels of efficiency  nor equity.
Finally, exploring  factors  that lead households  to perceive  a threat of future  land  loss (or gain)  through
administrative redistribution,  we note that it is farmers who are more productive  who have part-time jobs
in the off-farm  sector  who perceive  a threat of land redistribution  whereas renting  in  land  increases  the
expectation  of gaining  through  land  redistribution  in the future.  If, as  is reasonable,  households  adjust
their behavior to avoid actions  that might increase the probability of them losing their land, this suggests
that  the  danger  of land  redistribution  is  likely  to  retard  the  growth  of the  off-farm  economy  and,  if
realized,  will also hamper  agricultural productivity.  This, together with the fact that it may  be difficult to
satisfy the expectation of those who expect to gain from administrative redistribution,  suggests that a clear
2policy statement to reduce the scope for of land redistribution,  together with  proper measures to increase
households'  tenure  security  may have  an  important effect not only to  increase  tenure security and land-
related  investment but also to help jump-start off-farm  investment and labor markets.
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  two  reviews  the  literature  and  develops  a  model  and  an
estimation  strategy  to  analyze  land  rental  market  decisions  in a  framework  with  off-farm  employment
opportunities,  unobserved agricultural  ability  and non-zero  probability of losing land that  is rented  out.
Section  three  discusses  data  sources  and  provides  evidence  on  descriptive  statistics  as  well  as  the
distribution  of  agricultural  ability  across  producers.  Section  four  discusses  econometric  evidence  by
comparing the determinants  of administrative  and market-based  land  reallocations,  assessing  the factors
underlying  hypothetical  market participation,  and  quantifying  the gains from  better  functioning  of land
rental markets. Section five concludes with policy implications.
2. Background and conceptual  model
In  this  section  we  first  present  the  background  on  land  policy  issues  facing  Ethiopia,  their  historical
context, and the way in which exploration  of land markets as compared to administrative  transfers of land
can  help  to  provide  insights  and  policy  recommendations.  We  use  this  as  a  basis  for  formulating  a
conceptual  model  that  allows  us  to  derive  empirically  testable  hypotheses  which  are  related  to  the
empirical  literature on the subject of land markets  and land reallocation.  Finally, we discuss the strategy
for estimation and linking the hypotheses  to the data.
2.1 Review  of the literature
In  a  world  of perfect  information  and  complete  markets,  with  zero  transaction  costs,  the  ownership
distribution of land ownership  will affect households' welfare but will not matter for efficiency  outcomes,
and  everybody  will  operate  their  optimum  farm  size  (Feder  1985).  Government  involvement  in  land
markets has often been justified to counter imperfections  outside of the land market in rural areas where
widespread  imperfections  in  capital  and  labor  markets  might  prevent  operation  of land  markets  from
bringing about socially desirable  outcomes. We argue that market failures are more likely to be of policy
relevance  in  land  sales  rather  than  in  rental  markets  where  sharecropping  provides  an  opportunity  to
adjust to credit market imperfections  in a flexible way with at most moderate productivity losses.
Imperfections  in  rural labor markets  are mainly due to the cost of supervision  which arises from the fact
that,  except  in  very  limited  circumstances,  a  wage  workers'  true  effort  is not easily observable.  This
implies that wage workers will have limited incentives to exert effort and either need to be supervised at a
3cost'  or be offered  contracts  that provide  higher  incentives.  Family  members  have higher  incentives  to
provide effort than hired labor,  implying that it would be advantageous  for those who do not have enough
land  to  fully  utilize  their family  labor  endowment  to rent  in  land or for  those who  are  relatively  land
abundant to rent out, rather than engaging  in labor market transactions that incur supervision costs. Land
markets would thus have a positive impact on improving land access by land-poor households.  As long as
imperfections affect only one market, everybody would still cultivate the same amount of land per capita.
Credit market imperfections  can  offset or even eliminate  supervision  cost advantages of family  farmers.
For example,  if there is a need for up-front working  capital (e.g.  to acquire inputs  in addition to land and
labor)  and access to capital  depends on  initial  wealth, the optimal size of the operational  holding  would
vary  systematically  with  the  size  of  owned  holdings  even  if  land  rental  markets  operate  perfectly.
Recognition  of the limitations of land markets in an environment  characterized  by multiple  imperfections
in other factor markets has led policy makers to try and  impose restrictions  on their unhindered operation.
However,  while such capital constraints are likely to be of relevance,  and might be used to make at least a
case  in  principle for  government  involvement,  a large literature  has demonstrated  that adjustmnent  of the
contract  terms,  in  particular  the  adoption  of share-cropping  contracts,  provides  households  with  an
opportunity  to  overcome the working  capital shortage  at a relatively  small  cost. At the  same time,  it is
well known that the scope for government intervention  in land markets may be associated with a number
of undesirable side-effects.
First,  even if they achieve  their short-term  aims, such  interventions  are  likely to reduce tenure  security
and  impose  disincentives  for  investment.  In  fact,  a  large  literature  on  land  tenure  and  investment
demonstrates that higher levels of tenure security (though not necessarily  formal title) will lead to greater
investment  by households.  (Soule et al.  2000, Otsuka  2001, Place  and Migot-Adholla  1998, Binswanger
et al.  1995,  Besley  1995,  Migot-Adholla  et al.  1994,  Feder  1988).  While  much  of this  literature  has
focused  on  investment  that  is  directly  attached  to  land,  insecure  tenure,  i.e.  the risk  of losing  land  if
specific  actions  are  undertaken,  is  also likely to  lead households to  avoid  such actions.  For example,  if
non-agricultural  development  does require  discrete  and risky  investments  (e.g. migration),  the threat of
land loss in  case such land is rented out or if the household  takes on an off-farm job is likely to lead to a
less than optimal level of the activity of interest.
Second, experience all over the world helped policy-makers  to recognize  that the mere fact of markets not
leading  to optimum  outcomes  does not imply that other mechanisms  will automatically  be able  to bring
about a more desirable outcome.  A key reason is that, even in a closely knit and purely agrarian economy,
' In agncultural production,  supervision  is particularly  difficult or costly due to the spatial  dispersion  of the production  process  and the vagaries
of nature imply a need to constantly adjust to micro-variations of the natural environment.
4it is unlikely that village  leaders  will be able to observe cultivators'  agricultural ability.  Thus,  especially
where producers'  ability varies a lot or where the high political and administrative  cost of redistribution
implies that such an action is undertaken  only infrequently,  administrative  land  reallocation  can  lead to
large efficiency  losses,  compared to the operation of more decentralized  rental markets. This has  indeed
been  confirmed  for  China  (Deininger  and  Jin  2002).  The  allocative  inefficiencies  inherent  in
administrative processes  for land redistribution  are likely to multiply if possible rent-seeking behavior  by
administrators  is allowed  for. For example,  there are reports that bureaucrats may  use the system for their
own political  goals both  from China (Li 2002, Turner et al.  1998, Huang  1999, Chen and Davis  1998). In
Mexico,  long-standing  restrictions on the functioning of rental  markets converted  the land reform  sector
into a refuge of poverty (Velez  1995)  and political patronage  (Gordillo et al. .1998, Zepeda 2000).
A third reason  why reliance on administrative  reallocation  may  lead to undesirable  consequences  is that
such  intervention  can  give  rise  to  perverse  incentives  in  at least  two areas.  On  the one  hand,  greater
involvement by rural households  in the off-farm economy  is widely recognized  as a critical pre-condition
for broad-based  rural  development.  Insecure  land tenure  can undermine the ability to achieve this goal  if
doing so is incompatible with households'  desire to maintain their land rights. While a number of studies
draw this  link at the conceptual  level, e.g. for the case of China (Yang  1997, Murphy  2000) there is only
very weak and indirect empirical evidence pointing into this direction (Dessalegn  1997, Holden and Hailu
2001).  On the other  hand,  without restrictions  on population  growth, the fact that households'  ability to
obtain  land will essentially depend  on household  size, could imply that the desire to obtain land  is one of
a  number  of factors  that  contribute  to  high  population  growth.  Although  the  long-run  nature  of the
phenomena at stake makes it difficult to clearly disentangle  cause and effect, a study from Mexico indeed
finds rates of population growth to be significantly higher where population could be used as a means to
access  land  than where  this was not possible (De Vany and Sanchez  1979). Even though  a counterfactual
is difficult  to  construct,  it  may be  more than  merely  a coincidence  that,  in China,  the policy of land
redistribution  according to population size is combined with strict limitations on population growth.
While  there  are  few  examples  of reforms  to  liberalize  land  rental  markets,  existing  evidence  points
towards  a positive  effect,  suggesting that the  concerns  of critics  may be  less  relevant empirically  than
often thought.  In  Mexico,  abandonment of rental  restrictions  in the constitutional  reform  of 1992  had a
positive  impact on  productivity, land market activity,  and equity  rather than the predicted wave of land
sales and destitution (World Bank 2002). In China, land use rights that had been given to individuals after
the  1978  introduction of the Household  Responsibility System  were  increasingly  made more  secure  in  a
process  that  is still ongoing.  Restrictions  on the scope to exchange  land which are  imposed at the  local
level  have  been  shown  to  reduce  the  scope  for  efficiency-  and  equity  enhancing  land  transactions
5(Deininger and Jin  2002). Even though households'  preferences over land rights are shaped  by a complex
set  of factors  (Kung  2000,  Kung  2002),  there  is  evidence  that those  who  experienced  more  secure
property  rights  and  abandonment of administrative  land  reallocation  approve of this  measure  by a wide
margin (Deininger  and Jin 2003).  An impact of more secure  land rights on greater  rental  market activity
has also been confirmed  in Nicaragua (Deininger and Chamorro  2003).
2.2 A model  of agricultural production and land market participation
We formalize  these  ideas  using a  model with  household-specific  ability  where  those who  rent out  land
stand a  risk of losing their  asset to  redistribution.  Let the representative  household  i be  endowed  with
endowments  of labor  L,  and cultivable  land A,, a given  level of unobservable  agricultural ability a,, and
a vector  of household  characteristics  and  endowments  X.  Egalitarian  distribution  of land  endowments,
together with administrative  restrictions  imply that there is no market for (permanent)  farm  labor. Income
can  be derived  from  farming,  off-farm  employment,  and  land  rental.  Agricultural  production  follows  a
standard  production  function  and  is  also  affected  by  household-specific  ability  a,  so  household  i's
agricultural  production  is  given  by  a,f(7, 0,Ad  where I,' represents  labor  and A,  land used  in agricultural
production.  And f satisfies  standard  assumptions:  f,. > 0, fA  > 0  ,  f,-o,  < 0  ,  fAA  < 0,  flhA  > 0 and
f,v.  fA  - f  > 0.  A  second possibility to generate  income  is to  devote labor time  a = L,  - I,  to off-
farm employment at an exogenously given wage w. Finally, rather than self-cultivate,  households can rent
out  part  of their  land  endowment  or  rent  in  additional  land  for  agricultural  production  A, -A,  at the
competitive rental rate r.  In addition, there is a non-zero threat p that the household's  land will be subject
to administrative  redistribution.  Taking  all  of these elements  together,  we obtain  the expected  utility of
household  i  who  aims  to  maximize  current  income  plus  future  land  wealth  Y+V  (A) with  V(O)=O,
V'(A)>0.  Suppose there exist an probability pe[O,  I]  that an household who rent out part or all of its land
will  loss  the part  or all  of its  land,  but p  is irrelevant  to those  who  rent in  land  or  stay autarky.  With
further  assumption  of linearity  of future land  wealth function  (or  V"(A)=0),  expected future land wealth
of household  i can be expressed as  V[A,  + I,,,p(A, - A,)],  where  A, is the land endowment,  and A,
is  amount  used  for  self-cultivation.  While  this  expression  is  a  constant  for  households  who
engage only in self-cultivation (or renting in of land), the ability of those who rent out land in the
market to keep all of their endowment depends on p, households'  security of tenure.
6Household  i will choose  la*, 1as  well as A,*  by solving the income maximization problem:
la  X  pa,f(l,  A,)+wl,  +(A,  -A,)r+V[A,  -I0 " 1p(A,  -A,)]  (a)
Where  I,,  is  a binary  indicator  equaling one  if a  household  rents  out  land  and zero  otherwise, p is the
price of agricultural  goods,  r  is the amount of time  allocated to off-farm  labor (=L, - ,a  ), and all other
variables are as defined above. Optimal choices  ,a*,  I,'*  and A, will solve the first order conditions (FOC)
pa,f, 1 (1,0,A  ,)=w  (1)
plus, for households who rent in or stay in autarky  paJfA (l,a, A,)  = r
(2)
or for households who rent out  pa,fA (I,'  aA,)  = r - pV'  [A,  - p(A, - A,)]  (2)'
In the appendix, we derive the follo\ving propositions which form the basis for our empirical tests.
Proposition  1. In  an  agrarian  ecornomy,  the  amount of land  rented  in  is  strictly  increasing  in  a, and
strictly decreasing  in A.  On the other hand, the amount  of land rented out is strictly  decreasing  in a, and
strictly  increasing  in A.  In  this  setting,  rental  markets  would  transfer  land  to  "poor  but  efficient"
producers  and  overall  product  will  be  strictly  higher than  in  an  economy  where  rental  markets  do not
exist.  An empirically  testable hypothesis  emerging from this is that ability  will affect outcomes  in rental
markets but not results from administrative land redistribution.
Proposition 2. Imposing restriction in rental,  represented by a probability of losing land that is rented out
will  drive  a  wedge  between  the  armount of land  rent  payment  received  by those  renting  out,  therefore
reducing the amount of land that is transferred through markets and overall economic welfare.
2.3 Estimation strategy
Agricultural ability: To recover  agricultural  ability,  we  take  advantage  of the availability  of plot  level
data  on  production  to  estimate  a  production  function  with  household  fixed  effects.2 We  assume  that
households  use the Cobb-Douglas technology:
= exp(a,  +ac  )Aj, °'L  °2 KJ,  03  (4)
2 This forces us to exclude the 142 households who reported to cultivate only one plot in  1999
7where  Qj,,  is  agricultural  output produced  by producer i in villagej on ph plot; 4,p  L,,p and K,,p  are land,
labor and  capital used by producer  i in village j  on plot p to produce  output  Qjp,  and exp(a,+a), is the
efficiency  parameter which has a household- and a village-specific  element.3 01.  82, and  03 are technology
coefficients common to all producers. Taking logs of both sides of equation (10), adding an iid error term,
and  letting q be the  log of output,  a,  1, and  k be the  log of the  inputs,  and  a,  =  cy  +a;, we obtain  an
estimable  equation for production by producer i in villagej on plotp as follows.
qj,p  = a,, + 01a,p +  02 /pp + 03  ko,p  + -jp  (3)
Availability of multiple observations  per household allows to estimate this using household fixed effects.
qj,p -f  = a,,- a,  + 9(Zjp,--Zj,) + (j, p-  j,)  (4)
where Z is a vector consisting of a, 1,  k and 0 is a coefficient vector including  01,  62, and  03. The composite
efficiency  parameter  aj,  can then be recovered  for each  producer.  Given the fixed  location of land,  it is
unrealistic to expect trades beyond the village  level and what is relevant is therefore  a producer's relative
efficiency within the village. To eliminate  village effects, we us a similar procedure at the village level to
obtain  q; which can be used to obtain an estimate of a  (=a,,-a ) for each producer in the sample.
Land market participation:  To  identify  determinants  of  land  market  participation  as  emerging  from
proposition  1, we  specify  a reduced  form  regression  for transferring  in  or  out land through  land rental
markets,  including  both  cash  rent  and  share  cropping  with  a  household's  agricultural  ability,  its
endowments  of land,  labor,  other production  factors, and  available  off-farm  opportunities  as  right hand
side  variables.  Signs  on  other  covariates  will  provide  evidence  on  the  extent  to  which  operation  of
markets also can satisfy equity concerns. Formally,  we estimate
R,=  =,1o+ ,,a,  + 77X, + S0,+ e,  (5)
where  R, is a dummy for renting or the actual amount of area rented in or out, a, is agricultural  ability as
defined  above, X is the vector of other household  characteristics  that includes  educational  attainments,
family composition,  land endowments,  and total asset values,  and 0, proxies for off-farm opportunities  by
indicating  whether  the  household  has past "migration"  experience.4 We also  estimate  a  separate  set of
regressions  that  distinguishes  sharecropping  and  renting  so  as to  check  whether there  is  a progression
from one to the other, possibly in the sense of an "agricultural  ladder".
The latter is likely to be related to  infrastructure and  market, soil quality, climate, and other village level characteristics
As noted  earlier,  migration  in Ethiopia  is very limited,  so the  variable  chosen  is if  the head of the  household  has ever worked  outside  the
woreda.
8Since ability  can  not  be transferred  in  markets,  we expect  that markets transfer  land to  producers  with
higher agricultural  ability, i.e. A, >0. Of the other variables  included in Xthe most important prediction is
that the coefficient  on  land  endowment be negative,  in  line with  a redistributive  function  of land  rental
markets  which  would  lead  them  to transfer  land  to producers  with  lower  levels of endowments.  Also,
while  the amount  of agricultural  asset ownership  would  be  irrelevant  if markets  for  such  assets  were
perfect,  imperfections  in rental markets  for productive assets,  especially draft animals,  as variously found
in the  literature  (Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  1993,  Binswanger  and  Rosenzweig  1986)  would  lead  to  a
positive coefficient on this variable. To the extent that rental markets  help to bring about intergenerational
land transfers,  the age  of the household head would be expected  to be negative.  Finally,  past migration
experience will  increase the effective wage rate that can be earned, other things equal, make it more likely
for households to join the off-farm  labor market, thus leading to a positive expected  sign for renting out
and a negative one for renting in (Reardon et al 2001).
Market vs.  administrative reallocation:  To  compare determinants of market-  as compared to non-market
based  land reallocation,  we repeat estimation of equation  (5)  with the difference  that R, is  now replaced
by  a  dummy  for  whether  the  household  has,  during  the  last  5-year  period  received  land  through
redistribution  or through the market.5 This allows direct comparison  between the productivity  and equity
impact to be expected  from land markets  as compared  to administrative  reallocation.  We note,  however,
that,  especially  if past  redistribution  is  only  poorly  correlated  to  the  scope  for  future  land  market
intervention,  something that seems to be the case  in Ethiopia, exploring  determinants  of reallocations  in
the past will be of interest to compare between different types of allocation mechanisms but is unlikely to
have a direct impact on current household  behavior.
Determinants  offuture land  redistribution:  More direct inferences on potential behavioral adjustments by
households  in  response  to perceived  threats  of land  reallocation  are  available  from  an analysis  of the
factors  leading  households to expect that they will  lose land  in the future.  To conduct this  analysis, we
estimate  a probit  equation  similar to equation  (P/o)  where  R,  is replaced  by an indicator  of whether  a
household  expects  to  be  subject  to  land  loss  or gain  via  administrative  action  in the  future.  Also,  we
include an indicator for whether  or not the household head had taken on off-farm employment in  1999, a
variable  excluded  from  earlier  regressions  because  it  is jointly  determined  with  rental  decisions  and
therefore endogenous  to current household behavior but not to future expectations.
3. Background, data, and descriptive statistics
' The survey  does not elicit the size of area transferred  either  in total or under  different mechanisms  and  only provides  space for the two most
important  reasons of a decrease or  increase  in land, respectively  As there  are very few households  (10% of those  affected) who even give two
reasons, it is justifiable to assume that households either participated in rental markets or were subject to govemment redistribution
9The data used for this study is from the fifth round of the  Ethiopia Rural Household Survey, conducted  in
1999  by the Economics  Department  of Addis  Ababa University.  It covers  1680  households  in 4  of the
country's  major  regions,  Tigray,  Amhara,  Oromia  and  SNNP.  In  addition  to  standard  characteristics
routinely  included  in household  surveys,  this survey  provides information  on output as well as  inputs of
labor, seed,  purchased  inputs (fertilizer,  pesticide,  etc.), and cultivation techniques (e,.g. double cropping)
at the plot-level.  This allows us to estimate  a production function with household  fixed effects to recover
households'  agricultural  ability  as  discussed  above.  Moreover,  information  on  past  involvement  in
administrative  reallocation  or rental  markets  and  on whether  specific  households  expect to  gain  or lose
through administrative reallocations  in the future is included.
3.1 Land Policy  in Ethiopia
Ethiopia has  not  only a very  eventful  recent  history  in which  land issues  have  played an important  role
but, more importantly,  also faces  crucial decisions in the area of land policy and especially  land markets.
Historically,  land tenure in Ethiopia falls into three  broad periods.  Before  1975,  land was concentrated  in
the hands of absentee  landlords, tenure was highly  insecure, arbitrary  evictions posed a serious threat, and
many  lands  were  severely  underutilized.  The  land  tenure  system  was  characterized  by  great  inequality
which,  through  its  impact  on  production  and  investment,  not  only  affected  productivity  but was  also
considered  to  have  been  the  most  important  cause  of political  grievances  that  eventually  led  to  the
overthrow of the regime (Adal 2001).
Following the overthrow  of the imperial  regime  in  1975,  the Marxist government  (the Derg) transferred
ownership of all rural  land to the  state for distribution  of use rights to  cultivators through  local  peasant
associations  (PAs). The transferability of rights received was highly restricted;  transfer through lease  sale,
exchange, or mortgage,  among  others,  was prohibited  and inheritance  allowed only to  immediate family
members.  The  ability  to use  land  was  contingent on  proof of permanent  physical  residence,  thereby  for
example preventing  migration.  More  importantly,  tenure security  was  undermined  by the PAs'  and other
authorities'  ability to redistribute  land, often  for political reasons,  something that is well  documented  for
the case of Amhara (Ege 1997).
The  government  taking  power  in  1991,  though  committed  to a  free-market  philosophy,  has,  with three
notable exceptions,  made  few substantive  changes  to Ethiopian  farmers'  land  rights  which  are therefore
still  considered  to  be  quite  inadequate  (Hoben  2000).  First,  land  was  made  a  regional  responsibility,
implying  that  regional  governments  can  enact  laws  relating  to  the  nature  of  land  rights  and  their
transferability  as well as  land taxation.  Second, the frequency of land redistribution was to be reduced;  in
fact  Tigray declared  an end  to  administrative  land  redistribution  while  Oromia  restricted  the  scope  for
redistribution  to irrigated land. Finally, rentals have  been officially allowed (Pender and Fafchamps 2000)
10although  local  leaders  and  governments  seem  to  have  great  discretion  to  impose  restrictions  on  land
transfers.  For example,  the  region of Oromia allows farmers to rent  out only up to 50%  of their holding
and stipulates  maximum contract terms of 3 years for traditional  and  15 years for modern technologies.
The  Government's  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  espouses  the  guiding  principle  that  every  farmer  who
wants to make a livelihood from farming is entitled to have a plot of land free of charge (Federal Republic
of Ethiopia 2002). Even though it may conflict with this goal, the strategy also mentions a need for greater
tenure  security  and  better functioning  of land  rental  markets.  Responsibility  for  implementation  is  left
with regional  states which have adopted very different  implementation  strategies.6  Whether the lack of a
national  policy  on the  issue  is  a cause  for  concern  is  very  much  an  empirical  issue  of great  relevance
which we pursue  in more detail below.
3.2 Household  characteristics
Table  I provides  key household  characteristics  and details  on income  and crop  production.  The average
household  is composed of 5 people,  among which about 2 are aged less than  14 and 2.7 between  14 and
60.  The  average  age  of the  head  is  around  50  and  77%  of households  are  male  headed.  Levels  of
education  are very  low;  only 40%  of heads  in the  sample  are  literate, with  an average  of 1.35  years of
formal education.  However,  the fact that the maximum level of formal education  in any given household
is  3.2  years  suggests  that levels  of education  are  improving  among  the younger  generation.  All of the
descriptive  statistics  point to  large  differences  between  regions,  with  Tigray  being  by far the worst  in
terms of most social indicators.
These regional differences  are more pronounced  for total household income which, with an average  of B
2280, varies between  B 981  in Tigray and B 3116  in Oromia,  implying not only a relatively  high level of
poverty  but also large  regional  differences  in this indicator.  Using the  national poverty  line,  36%  of the
households are classified  as being poor, but 75% are so in Tigray.  Agriculture remains the mainstay of the
rural  economy, accounting  for about  70% of total income.  While 29% of households  complemented  their
agricultural  income with some receipts  from non-agricultural  self employment, only 4% had their primary
job  in the  non-farm  sector,  6%  received  wage  income  from  off-farm  work,  and  9% worked  in other
woreda  including  those who  sent home  remittance  and those worked  off-farm  in other woredas.  Within
the agricultural  sector,  income from crop production  is clearly  the most important,  accounting  for 66% of
total income, although with considerable  inter-regional variation  (from 46% in Tigray to 75% in Oromia).
The endowment of arable  land held by households,  excluding grazing and garden  land, is very small,  1.22
ha per household  or 0.29  ha per capita. Per  capita land holdings are  larger in Amhara  and Oromia  (0.45
11and  0.34  ha respectively)  and  very  low  in  Tigray  and  SNNP (0.12  ha),  in  line with  income  levels.  In
addition to limits on land endowments, use of modem technology remains low. While 73% of households
use fertilizer  which is  highly  subsidized,  only  19%  used  improved  seed and  31%  chemicals,  suggesting
that fertilizer may not always be used optimally. Regional differences  (only 6% and 4% of households  use
seeds and fertilizer,  respectively,  in Amhara) further exacerbate these differences.
3.3 Land market participation
Past and current  participation in market-based or administrative  land transactions,  as well as expectations
for the  future,  are  summarized  in table  2.  We  find that, with  the  exception  of Amhara  where  19%  of
households lost land and 11% increased their endowment through land redistribution over the last 5 years,
the  extent  of administrative  reallocation  of land  during  this  period  has  been  quite  limited  - only  few
households  in  Oromia and  SNNP  received  or lost  land  through  the  same  means,  bringing  the total  of
households  affected  to  4%  and  6%,  respectively.  The  share of households  who,  over the  last 5 years,
increased  or decreased  their cultivated  land  area by renting  in, a lower bound for activity  in land  rental
markets,7 was above the share of those who received land through redistribution,  with 11%  of households
reporting to have received land and 9% that they supplied land through either rental or sharecropping.
Current  (i.e.  1999)  participation  in  rental markets  is even higher.  Taking fixed rental  and sharecropping
together,  24% of households  report to currently  use somebody else's  land through  markets (7%  through
rental  and  17%  through  sharecropping).  The  fact that  this  percentage  is almost  equal  to the  share  of
households (20%)  who report to have supplied land to the market (6%  for rental;  14% for sharecropping)
suggests that migration remains extremely  limited and that absentee landlords are  virtually non-existent.8
With the exception  of Oromia, sharecropping  is more important  than fixed rental,  something that can be
explained by the fact that agricultural  production  in Ethiopia, largely  rainfed,  is risky. The importance  of
sharecropping  is  reinforced  by the fact that the area  involved is  much  larger than  for the case  of rental,
amounting to about half of the average  per capita endowment.
Data on future expectations reveal two observations  of interest. First, there is a resurgence of expectations
of land  reallocation  through  administrative  means;  10%  of survey  respondents  expect  to  lose  land  to
administrative  reallocation within  five years.  This  is  surprising  given that land  redistribution  in the past
decade  was  essentially  limited  to  Amhara.  Large  inter-regional  differences  in the expectation  of future
6 "In order to protect the user nghts of farmers, their land holdings should be registered and provided with certificate of user rights  In this regard,
a guarantee  may be  given to  the effect  that land  will not be re-divided  for a penod ranging from 20-30  years  Some regional states have already
started this aspect of the land use policy and it is a step in the right direction " (Republic of Ethiopia, 2002 p.53; italics added)
' The  survey asked whether the household's  land  size increased  or decreased  during  the last 5 years  and for the main  reason  for  such a change.
This implies that households who already rented  in land but did not increase the amount rented would have answered negatively to this question
a  The  only exception is Tigray where the share of  households  reporting to rent out is much  lower than the ones renting in Given the small sample
size  we can  not determine  whether this is  a significant  deviation from  national trends  Further examination of this issue with  a different data set
would be of interest
12redistribution (ranging from 20%  in Amhara to 2%  in Tigray) suggest that policy decisions  affecting these
issues are  indeed  taken at the regional  rather than the national  level.  A second  finding of at least equal
interest  is  the  large  discrepancy  between  those  who  expect  to  receive  additional  land  and  those  who
expect to lose land from redistribution.
With  the  exception  of Oromia,  the  share  of producers  who  expect  to  gain  from  administrative  land
reallocation  everywhere  is  at least  double  the share  of those  expecting  to have  to  cede  land  in such  a
process.  Since  reallocation of land  is a zero-sum game,  i.e.  it is impossible to give out more than what is
taken away from others, this implies that any redistribution that will try to satisfy expectations  will lead to
significant further fragmentation  of holding sizes in a situation where,  with  given technology, the amount
of land  available  to households  is often  already too small to produce  enough for subsistence  (Ethiopian
Economic Association  2002).
4. Econometric evidence
We find that both the  plot level production  function as well as the participation  equations  provide results
that  are  not  only  highly  significant  statistically  but also  in  line  with  our  predictions.  Markets  seem  to
transfer land from large  and  less efficient  to small and relatively  more efficient  producers  as predicted by
theory  and  there  is  some  indication  of producers'  progressing  from  sharecropping  to  cash  rental  with
increased  age  and  wealth  that  would  be  worth  exploring  further.  By  comparison  to  administrative
reallocation  which  seems to have  been driven mainly by political, rather than economic,  concems,  land
rental markets appear to have clear equity and efficiency advantages.
Exploration of the factors  leading  a surprisingly large  number of individuals to expect  losing or gaining
land through redistribution in the future highlights  that households  who  work in off-farm jobs for part of
the time and more productive producers  are significantly more  likely to be concerned about losing land to
redistribution.  As they would adjust their behavior so as to minimize the danger of land  loss, this would
be expected to lead to delayed and stunted development of the non-farm economy and, to the extent that it
reduces the extent of land transfers, possibly contributed to a reduction in agricultural productivity.
4.1 Market-based land transfers
Before  discussing  evidence  regarding  determinants  of market  participation,  we  review  results  from the
plot-level production  function with  household  or woreda fixed  effects for 1334 households who have  on
average  4.4  plots each  (appendix  table  1).  Parameters  on main  inputs  are  consistent with  expectations.
Application of modem seed,  fertilizer, and chemicals  all are  estimated to significantly  increase the value
of production.  Indicators  for land quality are  significant and of the expected sign; output from plots with
"secondary"  and  "tertiary"  land  quality  is about  8 %  and  11%  lower,  respectively,  than  for  plots with
13good soil quality, the default subsumed in the intercept.  Plots used for two seasons produce  slightly lower
output for each individual  season.  We also  note that a,, the deviation  of household  I's agricultural ability
from  the  village  mean,  ranges  between  -2.27  and  2.12,  pointing  towards  considerable  scope  for
improvements  in output and productivity  through reallocation of land between producers.
To assess whether markets  or administrative  mechanisms  contribute to such reallocation,  table 3 reports
results from  probit (columns  I and 2)  and tobit (columns  3 and 4)  equations  for market  land  transfers
where  rental  and  sharecropping  are  considered  together.9 Results  strongly  support  the hypothesis  that
rentals  transfer  land  from  households  with  low  agricultural  ability  and  relatively  abundant  land
endowments  to those with high  agricultural  ability  and  scarce endowments.  We  also find a pronounced
endowment effect whereby households  who have little land available per capita use rental markets to gain
access  to more  land  and vice  versa; notably the  coefficients  are  significant  at the  1%  level throughout.
This clearly  counters  fears that liberalization  of land rental  markets  would cause land  concentration  that
would leave the poor without land access.
Similarly strong effects are found for ability,  the  coefficient  of which  is always  very positive and highly
significant  in the renting  in equation,  implying that it  is clearly more  productive households  who obtain
land through rental. The coefficient on ability is always negative for renting out,  although significant only
at  10%  in the tobit equation,  suggesting  that  productivity  is  not the  only factor  leading  households  to
supply  land  to the rental  market. To illustrate the magnitude  of the estimated coefficients,  we note that,
compared  to the  household  with  the  lowest  agricultural  ability  in the sample,  the one with the  highest
ability is 23% more likely to obtain land through the rental market.  Similarly, a household  with per capita
land one standard deviation  above or below the mean  is 15% and 8%  more (or less)  likely to rent in (out)
land, respectively, than the average household.
In addition  to these coefficients,  factors  related  to  households'  endowment  with  other factors  and their
composition  are  as  expected.  The coefficient  on draft animals,  which  is positive  for renting in (together
with  other assets)  and negative  for renting  out  implies  that,  due to  imperfections  in  rental markets  for
animals,  it  is easier to transfer  land than animals  or associated  capital equipment.  Having  one more  draft
animal  will increase the probability of a household to receive in land by 8%. Male headed  households are
more likely to rent in land while female headed ones are more likely to rent out. Younger households  are
more likely to participate on the demand side of rental markets; the coefficients from the probit regression
suggest that the probability to rent  in  land increases  up to 26 years and slowly  declines thereafter.  Once
these  factors  are  accounted  for,  a  higher  number  of children  below  14 years  reduces  the probability  of
renting in and increases the probability of renting out.
144.2 Administrative land reallocation
Table 5 compares the performance  of administrative  reallocation  to land transfers  through decentralized
rental. This is of particular  interest with respect to the extent to which  land was transferred to households
with high agricultural  ability and limited land endowments,  allowing to implicitly test the hypothesis that
administrative  transfer  would  be  more pro-poor  than  independent  land rental.  We  find that, contrary  to
this  belief,  administrative  land  reallocation  did  not transfer  land  to more  efficient  or poorer producers.
There are not only few variables predicting households'  past receipt or loss of land through  redistribution;
in  fact,  the  only  variable  significant  at the  5%  level,  the  number of draft  animals,  goes  in  a direction
opposite from what  one would  expect from  a  measure  that is supposed  to  equalize  land  access  among
households. Ability  is insignificant,  supporting  the notion that this variable either  can not be observed  by
community  leaders  or that  increasing  efficiency has  not figured high  as a  goal  of activities  and policies
aimed at land redistribution.  Comparing this evidence'to  determinants of land  rental (column 2)  suggests
that, even though  the dependent  variable  in the recall  data is less precise than  what was discussed earlier,
the  latter  sh.fted  land  to those with  lower endowments  and  higher levels  of productivity,  and was thus
arguable more redstributive than  administrative  reallocation.
Similarly,  the  only  variable  that  is  highly  significant  for  loss of  land  through  redistribution  is  the
household's educational  level and the number of draft animals. This supports the notion that redistribution
is motivated  more by political than economic considerations.  While low ability is not estimated to have
been a  driving factor  behind supply  of land to rental  markets, the positive  and significant coefficient  on
households'  land endowment, the negative  coefficient on male headship, and the negative  coefficient on
the number of draft animals owned  in the renting out equation  all suggest that, historically,  land  markets
have  performed  much  better  than  administrative  means  in  benefiting  the  poor  and  increasing  overall
productivity.  Given that it is widely acknowledged  that land redistribution was largely a political exercise,
the  above  findings just  provide  empirical  confirmation  of conventional  wisdom  and  are  thus  not too
surprising.  Still,  if the past  is  any  guide  to the  future,  we would  not  expect  future  administrative  land
reallocation  to  have  a positive  impact on productivity  or increased  land  access  by the poor.  To assess
whether the scope of such redistribution  may have a negative impact on household behavior through other
channels, we turn to the analysis of factors affecting households'  expectation regarding land redistribution
in the future.
4.3 Future land redistribution
Factors  that systematically  increase households'  expectation of experiencing an increase or a decrease  in
their  land  endowment  through  administrative  measures  are,  to the  extent  that  they  affect  household
9As table 4  illustrates, results  from separate equations for sharecropping  and cash rent provide substantively  identical results
15behavior, arguably more  important from a policy perspective.  Results from regressions with regional  and
woreda dummies, respectively,  are presented in table 6.
The most significant determinant  that leads households to believe that land will be taken away from them
is  whether  or not  the  head  has  a  part-time,  though  by  no  means  primary, job  in  the  off-farm  sector.
According to our estimates, off-farm  employment increases  the subjective probability  of future land loss
by between  10%  and  15%. To  the extent that households  base future actions  on such beliefs, the fear of
losing  land  is  likely  to  lead  to  a  considerable  reduction  in  their  willingness  to  take  on  off-farm
employment which could  have far-reaching  implications  for the emergence  of the non-farm  economy,  a
factor which, all observers  agree, will be of critical importance for future rural development  in Ethiopia.
It  is also worth noting that, contrary to what was found in China where administrative  land redistribution
clearly  took land form larger farmers and had a negligible  productivity impact (Deininger and Jin 2002),
the regressions  suggest that, in Ethiopia,  it is more productive farmers who are most exposed to the threat
of future land  redistribution,  as  implied by the positive and highly  significant coefficient  on ability.  Any
redistribution conforming  to  these expectations  would thus  directly decrease  overall  productivity  of the
rural  sector.  By  comparison,  farm  size,  as  measured  by  the  per  capita  land  endowment,  remains
insignificant.  In addition, higher levels of education  and a lower number of members  between the age of
14 and 60, is also found to have a significant effect on the perceived  probability of land loss.
While  the  fact  that  the  dependent  variable  is  a dummy  precludes  us  from  making  inferences  on  the
possible  impact  of such  redistribution  on  production,  we  note  that the  increase  in  the  probability  of
suffering  a  land  loss that  is associated  with  higher ability  is quantitatively  large;  compared  to  the  least
productive  producer  in the  sample,  the most productive  one  is almost  20% more  likely  to  lose  land to
reallocation.  To  the  extent  that  fears  of  land  expropriation  by  authorities  lead  households  with
comparative advantage  in non-farm jobs to reduce their participation  in non-farm employment, one would
clearly expect  reduced  growth of the off-farm sector as  a result of such high  levels of tenure  insecurity.
Eliminating  such fears would  then,  by increasing  the scope  for off-farm  employment,  result in a Pareto
improvement.
Turning to determinants  of households'  belief in  whether or not they will receive (rather than lose)  land
through  administrative  means,  there  is  some  indication  that,  within  any  given  woreda  it  is  indeed
producers with  less land who expect to gain in a future redistribution (column  4 of table 6). However, the
fact that the number of household members  between  14 and 60 years is negative  suggests that these may
not have the labor force to make use of the  land. Also, households renting in land think they will be able
to benefit  from land redistribution  in the future.  Even though  the link is less  direct than  for of off-farm
employment, this  could contribute  to undermining the future functioning of rental markets  in the future.
16From all perspectives then, the prospect of future redistribution  appears to be conducive neither to a more
egalitarian  distribution of land nor to higher levels of rural productivity.
5. Conclusion  and policy implications
This  study  contributes  to  the  literature  in two ways.  First,  we demonstrate  empirically  that land  rental
markets  in  Ethiopia  work  better  than  administrative  mechanisms  to  reallocate  land  among  producers.
Despite  some  remaining  restrictions,  land  rentals did  help to further  equity and efficiency  objectives  in
ways that are  superior to what has been accomplished  by administrative  reallocation of land.  Contrary to
fears that land  markets might  lead to accumulation  of land  in the hands of the rich and powerful,  greater
emphasis on rental  markets  as compared to administrative  reallocation  of land would provide benefits  to
poor but  efficient  producers  who  have  few alternative  opportunities  of using their  labor  endowment.
Administrative  land  reallocation  was  largely  a  political  exercise  that  contributed  to  neither  of these
objectives.
Second,  we document  a link  between  higher levels  of off-farm employment  and lower levels  of tenure
security  in  the form  of a (individual)  fear of being  affected  by  future  land  redistribution.  To the extent
that, for agrarian  countries  like Ethiopia, development  of economic  opportunities  in the non-farm  sector
will be a critical  element of any strategy aiming at higher economic  growth, this suggests that land tenure
could have implications that go beyond  mere land-related  investment.  This is of policy relevance because,
despite  limited  success  of this  measure  in the  past,  support  for  administrative  reallocation  of land  in
Ethiopia  appears to  be on the increase.  Even  in the best of cases,  and assuming considerably  improved
mechanisms,  Ethiopia's  narrow land  base will limit the scope for such a measure  to lead to  significantly
improve the welfare of the large majority  of producers.  Also, unrealistic  expectations about the potential
impact of redistribution  can easily lead to an inflation of expectations that might be problematic.  Finally,
and  most  importantly,  our  regressions  show  that  the  scope  for administrative  land  redistribution  will
affect household  behavior  in ways that can undermine  precisely the non-farm  activities  on which further
development of Ethiopia's rural areas depends.  The  scope for weak land rights to limit the emergence  of
the non-farm sector  could be of considerable  policy relevance  and should  be explored  in more  detail for
other countries as well.
Taking  these  two  findings  together  suggests  that  irrespectively  of  a  possible  need  for  transitory
arrangements,  abandoning  the  scope  for  future  land  reallocation  could  have  considerable  economic
benefits  while  losses associated  with such a measure  appear to be mostly of a political nature.  A  policy
statement highlighting that there will be no land distributions  in the future could thus actually benefit the
poor. Moreover,  the evidence  in favor of an economically and socially positive role of land rental markets
17suggests that further steps to eliminate obstacles to the functioning  of such markets would be beneficial  to
broader rural development  in Ethiopia.
In this context,  it would be of interest to expand the evidence  provided here in two respects.  On the one
hand, the data available provide an excellent opportunity  to further  quantify welfare  implications of land
rental markets not only in a static but also a dynamic perspective and to test the extent to which existence
of an "agricultural  ladder" has allowed households to proceed over time from being sharecroppers to cash
rental  and  possibly towards  land  ownership  would  be of interest.  Also,  recent  evidence  suggests  that
allowing transferability  of land  in  sales markets  is  likely to be associated  with  considerable  investment
benefits.  At the  samne  time, high  risk of agriculture  and the fact that sales  markets  are  more likely to be
affected by credit market imperfections than those for rental, implies that land sales markets may be more
not always  lead to efficiency  improvements, making an empirical exploration of this issue of interest.  Our
results suggest that it would be useful to  focus policy discussion  on these  issues,  rather than  a model of
redistribution  which  had  very  limited  success  in the  past  and,  in  addition,  may  negatively  affect  the
development of the non-farm economy.
18Table 1. Basic  characteristics of the sample
Region
National  Tigray  Amhara  Oromia  SNNP
Household  characteristics
Household size  5.04  4.72  4.31  5.11  5.81
No.  of people less than  14  1.93  2.04  1.60  1.97  2.17
No. of people  between  14 and 60  2.75  2.19  2.32  2.82  3.31
No. of people older than 60  0.36  0.49  0.40  0.31  0.33
Has male household  head  0.77  0.51  0.73  0.81  0.85
Age of household head  49.26  51.53  50.28  48.38  48.52
Illiteratacy rate  59%  77%  63%  53%  58%
Year of education  of household head  1.35  0.43  0.88  1.38  2.11
Max. years of education of household  3.21  2.45  2.39  3.08  4.51
Income  and its composition
Total household  income (Birr)  2280.26  980.93  2446.17  311625  1360.01
Share of poor'  36%  75%  30%  21%  52%
Share  of agricultural  income in total  80%  67%  78%  86%  78%
Value of total hosuehold  assets  486.05  275.62  375.10  639.05  457.96
Household  head with non-ag primary job  4%  2%  5%  3%  5%
Household head worked  off-farm  6%  7%  9%  4%  6%
Share with self-employment  29%  12%  25%  28%  40%
Household head migrated  9%  11%  7%  90/0  10%
Crop production Charateristics
Share of crop income in total  66%  46%  55%  75%  72%
Own cultivable land holding2 1.22  0.44  1.49  1.67  0.58
Per capita own arable land holding2 0.29  0.12  0.45  0.34  0.12
Share of households used improved  seed  19%  10%  6%  24%  28%
Share of  households  using fertilizer  73%  74%  64%  90%  55%
Share  of households  using pesticides,  31%  1%  4%  62%  22%
Share  of households with draft animals  85%  94%  98%  92%  57%
Number of draft animals owned  3.87  4.63  6.52  3.61  1.45
'Total household income less than national  poverty line (1075  Br per household)
2Excludes  grazing and garden  land
19Table 2: Past, current, and future changes  in land holdings
Region
Average  Tigray  Amhara  Oromia  SNNP
Changes in land holding last 5 years
Increased land through reallocation  4%  0%  11%  1%  1%
Increased land through rental/sharecropping  11%  1%  14%  12%  90/0
Lost land through  reallocation  6%  0%  190/o  1%  2%
Rented/sharecropped  out land  90/0  4%  5%  12%  9%
Market participation
Rented in land  7%  1%  5%  13%  4%
Area rented in (ha)  0.05  0.00  0.03  0.12  0.01
Sharecropped in  land  17%  3%  35%  10%  12%
Area sharecropped  in (ha)  0.12  0.01  0 30  0.07  0.04
Rented out land  6%  1%  3%  12%  4%
Area rented out (ha)  0.04  0.00  0.03  0.08  0.01
Sharecropped out land  14%  15%  24%  12%  8%
Area sharecropped  out (ha)  0.12  0.06  0.24  0.10  0.04
Expectation regarding land changes
Expects increase through redistribution  11%  13%  14%  11%  5%
Expects decrease through redistribution  10%  2%  7%  20%  3%
20Table 3. Determinants of participation in land rental markets
Probit Results  Tobit Results
Agricultural  ability  0.051**  -0.025  0.251***  -0.170*
(1.99)  (1.53)  (2.81)  (1.87)
Per capita land holding  -0.430***  0.236***  -1.578***  1.423***
(5.34)  (6.92)  (5.67)  (7.86)
Head's age  (log)  1.983*  0.399  5.838  2  110
(1.80)  (0 54)  (1.52)  (0.53)
Head's age (log) squared  -0 289*  -0.049  -0.851*  -0.253
(1.95)  (0.50)  (1.65)  (0.48)
Noofpeople<  14a  -0.029***  0.020***  -0.096***  0.116***
(3.10)  (3.26)  (2.96)  (3.56)
No. of people  14 - 60a  -0.003  0.001  -0.012  0.015
(0.32)  (0.13)  (0.34)  (0.42)
No of people < 60a  -0.007  -0.002  -0.065  0.023
(0.22)  (0.09)  (0.55)  (0  18)
Max years of education  0.009*  0 002  0.039**  0.017
(1.78)  (0.64)  (2.31)  (0.96)
Male headed  0.134***  -0.080***  0.524***  -0.370***
(3.76)  (2.96)  (3.48)  (2.96)
Migration  0.037  0.139***  0.052  0.537***
(0.73)  (3.61)  (0.30)  (3.42)
Value of assets  0.000***  -0.000  0.000***  -0.000
(2.87)  (1.21)  (3.28)  (0.87)
Number of draft animals  0.022***  -0.014***  0.097***  -0.087***
(3.49)  (3.59)  (4.53)  (4.18)
Constant  -13.812*  -5.985  -11.900*  -5.999
(1.90)  (0.79)  (1.67)  (0.81)
No  of observations  1236  1236  1236  1236
Log-likelihood  -537.73  -418.61  -755.46  -485.52
Absolute value of t statistics  in parentheses
* significant  at 10%;  **  significant at 5%;  ***  significant at 1%
Regional dummies included throughout but not reported
21Table 4. Determinants  of area rented in/out or sharecropped in/out
Area rented in  Area  Area rented out  Area
sharecropped in  sharecropped  out
Agricultural  ability  0.204**  0.188**  0.070  -0.275*
(1.97)  (2.08)  (0.63)  (1.92)
Per capita land holding  -1.520***  -1.592***  1.042***  1.170***
(2.83)  (5.49)  (4.07)  (4.35)
Head's age (log)  0.096  6.090  1.231  0.075
(0.01)  (1.56)  (0.23)  (0.01)
Head's age (log) squared  -0.024  -0.895*  -0.112  0.066
(0.03)  (1.71)  (0.16)  (0.09)
No. of people<14  -0.023  -0.108***  0.095**  0.1114*
(0.44)  (3.29)  (2.03)  (2.50)
No. of people between  14 and 60  -0.007  0.026  -0.029  0.010
(0.14)  (0.76)  (0.58)  (0.20)
No  of people >60  -0.307  0.082  -0.055  -0.039
(1.50)  (0.70)  (0.32)  (0.23)
Max. years of education of household  0.029  0.025  -0.018  0.010
(1.00)  (1.47)  (0.66)  (0.41)
Headed  by male  0.268  0.531***  -0.137  -0.406**
(1.10)  (3.31)  (0.78)  (2.42)
Household  head migrated  -0.049  0.105  0.467**  0.5314*
(0.16)  (0.59)  (2.17)  (2.52)
Value of assets  0.000**  0.000  -0.000  0.000
(3.43)  (0.99)  (1.26)  (0.28)
Number of draft animals  0.076**  0.091***  -0.120***  -0.062*
(2.23)  (4.21)  (3.21)  (1.94)
Constant  -2.861  -12.200*  -4.884  -2.994
(0.24)  (1.68)  (0.50)  (0.28)
Observations  1236  1236  1236  1236
Log-likelihood  -616.83  -301.17  -245.10  -313.76
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, 444 significant at  1%
Regional dummies  included throughout but not reported
22Table 5.  Determinants of past changes  in  land holding
Gained  land through.  Lost land through..
Redistribution  rental  redistribution  rental
Agric. ability  0.002  0.035*  -0.003  -0.002
(0 44)  (1.94)  (0.60)  (0  14)
Percapitaland  0.005  -0.068*  0012  0.105***
(0.66)  (I  70)  (1.62)  (4.20)
Head's age (log)  -0.088  0.707  0.214  -0.034
(0.66)  (0.86)  (I  05)  (0.06)
Head age square  0 010  -0 099  -0.027  0.008
(0.55)  (0.91)  (0.99)  (0 11)
No of people < 14a  0.000  -0.006  -0 002  0 008*
(0.35)  (I  00)  (0.93)  (1 91)
No. of people  14 - 60a  0.002*  0.008  -0.000  -0.002
(1.92)  (I  35)  (0.18)  (0.40)
No of people < 60a  0.006  -0.035  0.006  -0 025
(1.43)  (1.36)  (1.09)  (1.28)
Max years of education  -0.000  0.003  0 002***  0.002
(0.06)  (I  17)  (3.30)  (077)
Male headed  -0.010  0 081***  0.000  -0 050**
(1.61)  (3  16)  (008)  (2.35)
Head migrated  -0.002  -0.006  -0.004  0 042
(0.27)  (0.18)  (0 48)  (1.49)
Value of assets  0.000  0.000  -0 000  -0 000
(0.10)  (0.94)  (0.08)  (0.04)
Number of draft animals  0.002**  0.001  0 003***  -0.008***
(2.30)  (0.32)  (3  37)  (2 58)
Observations  1236  1236  1236  1236
Log-likelihood  -160 79  -437.45  -219.68  -307 68
Absolute  value of  z statistics in parentheses
* significant at  10%, ** significant at 5%; *  *  significant at  1%
Regional dummies  included throughout but not reported
23Table 6. Determinants of household's  expectations  regarding future redistribution
Expects to
Lose land  Gain  land
Agricultural  ability  0.021**  0.044***  -0.024*  -0.019
(2.04)  (2.60)  (1.81)  (1.52)
Per capita land holding  0.032  0.028  -0.004  -0.106***
(1.13)  (0.61)  (0.15)  (2.74)
Head's age (log)  0.022  -0.011  -0.012  -0.009
(0.04)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)
No. of people<14  -0.005  -0.004  -0.005  -0.006
(0.94)  (0.45)  (0.94)  (1.12)
No. of people between  14 & 60  -0.015**  -0.021**  -0.012**  -0.018***
(2.52)  (2.47)  (2.02)  (3.04)
No. of people >60  -0.011  -0.011  0.005  0.001
(0.62)  (0.42)  (0.28)  (0.04)
Maximum  years  of  education  of  0.009***  0.005  0.001  -0.000
household  (3.39)  (1.40)  (0.45)  (0.16)
Headed by male  0.008  -0.007  0.026  0.032*
(0.42)  (0.23)  (1.31)  (1.72)
Value of assets  0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000
(0.40)  (0.08)  (1.29)  (0.27)
Number of draft animals  -0.004  -0.002  -0.002  -0.003
(1.20)  (0.45)  (0.63)  (0.89)
Head w off-farm experience  0.105***  0.152***  -0.036  -0 031
(2.98)  (2.97)  (1.18)  (1.04)
Area rented out  -0.030  -0.020
(1.04)  (0.48)
Area rented in  0.039***  0.029**
(2.86)  (2.09)
Observations  1236  882  1236  1194
Log-likelihood  -350.91  -288.73  -342.05  -315.20
Dummy  Region  Woreda  Region  Woreda
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at  10%; **  significant at 5%; **  significant at  1%
24Appendix  1. Results of Fixed Effect Panel Estimation of Plot Level  Production Function
Household Fixed Effects  Woreda Fixed Effects
Log of labor usage  0.169***  0.158***
(9.94)  (12.08)
Log of cultivated area  0.457***  0.439***
(22.08)  (27.94)
Log of value of seed use  0.023***  0.034***
(3.33)  (5.32)
Dummy modem seed use  0.404***  0.424***
(6.95)  (7.99)
Land quality secondary  -0.079**  -0.052**
(1.99)  (2.05)
Land quality tertiary  -0.I0l**  -0.136***
(2.08)  (3.55)
Plot used for two seasons  -0.086  -0.026
(1.64)  (0.69)
Fertlizer used  0.067*  0.067**
(1.89)  (2.29)
Chemicals  used  0.199***  0.239***
(4.31)  (6.23)
Observations  5839  5839
No of households/woredas  1334  18
R-squared  0.37  0 36
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at  10%; **  sigificant at 5%; *  significant at 1%
Crop dummies included  but not reported
25Appendix  2: Proofs  for main propositions
Proposition  1. Among the households who rent out land, the higher their ability, a, the less likely they will rent out.
Alternatively,  among households who rent in land, the higher a, the more likely they  are to rent in.
To show this, totally differentiate  (1) and (2) with respect to a, then reorganize  the two differential  equations  into a
Prw.flO  pafl-Al  alaI aa  r- pf/
matrix form, yielding:  IP  fA>  PC4AAi  81A/8a]  L  1
LP afAl  PCYfM iLa.  /a aJ  - pfA 
Solving for  AA Ia  by Cramer's rule, yields:
pa~f,A,'  PfA  P  Af,e  +P
2 C  f  f
8.4, I/aa - H/  Al1.  >0 (for  fA  >0,  >0,  l.  <0,  and  we
know  Hi>0  by the sufficient second order condition of maximization  problem.
Similarly for household who rent out land, totally differentiating  (1) and (2)'  with respect to a, then reorganizing the
pafzOO p  cl>A  81 / daa1  [Pf 1 1
two differential equations  into a matrix form  yields:  J I+  (a)  l  aa  Pf= 
,  . paf~Al'  P69AA  + PV()  A  A  PfA_
Solving for  aA, / aa  by Cramer's rule yields:
pa/h 1,,  - Pfoh
8.,  laa - PC'fA,"  PfA |  - P  {f,O  + p%fA,.f.  > 0
1H II  H  I
This implies that  for all  households  that participate  in rental  markets  (on either side),  the amount  of area operated
will increase with ability.
For households renting in, the amount of land rented in is the difference between the amount of operational  land and
the land endowment,  i.e.  A.  = A - A  (Al).
Total differentiation of both sides of (Al) with respect to  a, yields  a'  =  _  > 0,  implying that for households
da  daz
who rent in land, the  amount of land rented in is increasing in agricultural  ability.  Total differentiation of both sides
of (Al) with respect to  A, yield  -m =-1  < 0, implying that for the households that rent in land,  the amount of
aA
land rented in is strictly decreasing in land endowment.
26For those households that rent out land, the amount of land rented out is the difference  between the land endowment
and the  land used  for self-cultivation,  or fortnally,  A0,t1 = A-A  (A2).  Total  differentiation  of both sides of (A2)
with  respect  to  a, yields  = _-  < 0,  which  implies that  for those  households  who  rent  out  land,  the
amount of land rented out will decrease  in agricultural ability. Total differentiation of both sides of (A2) with respect
to  A, yields  '- = I > 0  (for by assumption,  individual household's  operational  land,  A is not constrained by aA
individual  household's  endowment),  implying that for those households  who rent out land, the amount rented out is
strictly increasing  in land endowment.
Proposition 2.  Imposing restriction  in rental, represented by a probability of losing land that is renied out, will cause
households  who would be better off in off-farm employment (e.g. due to low agricultural  ability) to stay in farming,
or  aA 0U,  / lap > O where p denotes the probability of losing land that is rented out.
Since this is only relevant  for households  who rent out  land, we  can  prove the proposition  by totally  differentiating (I) and (2)'
with respect to p, and then reorganizing the two differential  equations  into matrix form, which yields:
[paf,4,-  PCP4>A  1 [al  IaplF  _  1
PfAl'  pafA  + pV  ()j  aAlap  P-V'R[,  + p(A,  -A 1)]J'
The  first matrix  is H,  as defined  earlier,  and  the sufficient  second  order conditions  of the household's  maximization  problem
imply that it is negative.
|Pfiel  pal,.V
Solving Ml/dtpusing Cramer's  rule, yields:  aA, l8p =  = -a  H  )  > 0.
aA,  /ap  ~I H I  H  I
Taking derivative of  (A2) with respect to p yield  aA,o,  / ap = 8A  p -I  A / ap = -aA l ap < 0.
Therefore  households who would be  better off renting out land will be forced  to rent out less or even stay autarky  due to the high
restriction  on land transfer (note that restriction increases as p is getting bigger).
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